People have often heard of the “transcendentals” — truth, beauty and goodness1 — without fully understanding what the scholastics mean by a transcendental. When the scholastic philosophers were discussing transcendentals, they meant things that all beings possessed simply by virtue of existing. Not all to the same degree, but all to some degree. God is, of course, the peak and consummation of all of these things.
Moreover, there are more transcendentals than those three. Being is one, as is unity.
One theory that involved the transcendentals that was and remains very influential in scholastic and neo-scholastic philosophy involves the idea that Goodness and Being are controvertible: they are, properly considered, literally the same thing.
Yeah, you read that right.
Aquinas deals with this in Question 5 of Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae. But to understand his argument, you first need to understand Aristotelian metaphysics. Or, at least, the distinction between act and potency. Fortunately for you, I already wrote a primer on that, which you can find here:
The long story short of the linked post (and of the act/potency distinction) is that every person exists in a state of becoming. The ways that you currently exist — your 5’10” height, buzz-cut hair and very strong singing voice — are those ways that you exist in act.2 Those ways that you could exist but do not currently — having a golden California-worthy tan, the muscles to run a 4.3 second 40-yard-dash or purple hair — are things that you have in potency or potential.3 When you gain or lose an attribute, you move from potency to act. I am potentially red and sweaty but actually calm and normal-colored. If I ran around the block a few times (okay, it would probably just take one time), I would move from potentially red and sweaty to actually red and sweaty.
This also implies that, at least in one sense, you can gain and lose being by adding or losing attributes.
Here are a few more principles that I will assert and motivate but not necessarily defend. These are fundamental principles of Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy:
1. Evil is a Privation
What, exactly, is evil? God created all things, but that means that if evil has actual existence, then God did not just allow evil, but created it and currently holds it in existence. This seems impossible, which is why St. Augustine defined evil as a privation, or lack, of something that ought to be there. So when I am sick, the evil that present is not a positive something that is in me, but a lack of health proper to a human being. Aquinas holds this view, and this is still the dominant theory amongst Christian philosophers today.
2. Goodness is what all desire
The definition of the good, according to Aristotle, is that which all things desire. In other words, to be good is to be desire-able by other things. This does not mean, by the way, that a thing is only good because something desires it, like if I said that a person was unloveable simply because he had nobody to love them. Rather, to be good is to have the capacity to be desired by another.4
This seems relatively uncontroversial to me, at least insofar as what it is to desire something is to think it good in some respect, though not necessarily in all respects. And I think it would be silly to claim that something could be good even if it was impossible to desire it.
Now, here is the argument that Aquinas puts forward in the Summa:
Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in account; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): Goodness is what all desire. Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 4; Q. 4, A. 1). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.5
If we were to put the argument in valid syllogistic form, it might look like this.
All goodness is desirable [since goodness is what all things desire].
All things that are desirable are perfect in some capacity [since all things desire their own perfection].6
All things that are perfect are actual to the same degree.
Therefore, all goodness is actual to the same degree.
It is existence that makes all things actual
If it is the case that (all goodness is actual to the same degree.), and (it is existence that makes all things actual), then goodness and existence are the same in reality.
Therefore, goodness and existence are the same in reality.
Now, here is a quick justification for each premise.
1. All goodness is desirable
Again, Aquinas, Aristotle and I all think this to be true by definition. I motivated this assumption above, and I think it is pretty uncontroversial if understood properly.
2. All things that are desirable are perfect in some capacity
So “perfect” here does not mean “without flaw” but simply as having a good trait that it ought to have. All beings desire to have those good things that they are capable of possessing, even if those beings are confused about what those goods actually are. Therefore, if a thing is desirable, it is because those things have a perfection, that is, a good trait. After all; if that thing did not have the perfection, what is there to desire in the first place?
3. All things that are perfect are actual to the same degree.
If you are perfect, you have the traits you are supposed to have. But those traits must be in act, or you are supposed to actually have them. Therefore, to the extent that something is perfect, it is actual.
4. Therefore, all goodness is actual to the same degree.
This follows necessarily from the first three premises. If you are looking to debunk a premise, do not choose this one.
5. It is existence that makes all things actual
Insofar as a trait or being is actual, it is because that trait or being that only existed in potency now exists in act. This happens because it has gained existence. The trait or being did not exist, and now it does.
6. If it is the case that (all things that are good are actual to the same degree), and (it is existence that makes all things actual), then goodness and existence are the same in reality.
The first statement (all things that are good are actual to the same degree) implies that goodness and actuality are identical. The second implies that actuality and existence are identical. Therefore, goodness and existence are identical.
The fundamental idea behind this argument is that when a thing gains perfections, it becomes more the thing it ought to be. It gains attributes and, since it is existence that makes things actual, it must be gaining existence when it gains perfection.
So, when a thing gets better, it is because it is becoming more the thing it should be. It is gaining actuality in the traits it should have. This means that, simply by virtue of existing, all things have some degree of goodness. And to the extent that they are bad, it is actually a lack of being, a lack of some trait or attribute that they should have.
That being said, Aquinas acknowledges that, of course, we think of being and goodness as different. The reason for this is that being and goodness are different aspects of the same thing. That is, when we think of a thing as existing, we think of it insofar as it has actual being. And when we think of a thing as being good, we think of it insofar as it is desirable (or, as Hildebrand would say, as it is valuable). Thus Aquinas says that, while in reality being and goodness are the same, they are different “in idea.”
This doctrine, of course, has some massive implications on how we think of ourselves, God and existence in general.
First, it means that, to say that God is pure act (as Thomists do) is to say that God is existence itself and goodness itself. Since being and goodness are the same in reality, God’s all-goodness actually comes from his being pure existence.
This also gives a kind of sensibility to when we say that a very bad man is “no man at all,” or that another, better man is “more a man than you will ever be.” These sayings are not proof of the controvertibility of goodness and being, but it certainly is a benefit of this theory that it describes and explains these pre-philosophical descriptions of the world.
Finally, this larger explanation of how a thing can be different in idea but the same in reality actually reveals how we can talk about God in different ways (being all-knowing, all-present, etc.) while still maintaining that there is no real distinction in God because he is simple. While in reality, God is completely simple and therefore has no parts or attributes, in idea we think of God insofar as he is desirable, knowing, present, etc. and thus reflect on his aspects without actually introducing any true distinction in Him.
So, at least in one sense, if you exist, you are good. Congratulations!
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Okay look I know ChatGPT uses em dashes all the time but I WROTE THOSE DASHES AND THE REST OF THIS ESSAY. You may think this is a word salad AI philosophy essay, but really it is a profound person-written philosophy essay. Wait…
If it is easier to understand, you could also describe it as a way you actually exist.
Once again, this could be described as being a way you potentially exist.
Early readers might notice a similarity between Aristotle’s view of the good and Hildebrand’s view of the important. You are not imagining things. Read more here.
Summa Theologiae Prima Pars, Question 5, Article 1. https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.I.Q5.A1.C
Note here that “perfect” does not mean “without flaw,” but more along the lines of “achieving some goal of its essence.” Thus a being can have multiple perfections, and have a perfection, like physical beauty, without having all perfections.
I think this account of goodness is problematic as it seems to land you into either moral subjectivism or moral naturalism, both of which I would say are untenable views to hold as a moral non-naturalist.
> This seems relatively uncontroversial to me, at least insofar as what it is to desire something is to think it good in some respect, though not necessarily in all respects.
I dont think thats the case. You can desire something without thinking it good in any way shape or form. For example, picture a man who unfortunately gets frequent urges to torture himself, but never gets any satisfaction or joy or any utility from doing it, along with it not developing his moral character or other capacities in any way. Matter of fact, lets assume that the torture actually decreases those capacities and character.
This seems like a paradigmatic case of one desiring something yet not considering it good at all.
This is great Alex! It reminds me of Pieper's reflections, with Aquinas of course, on why prudence is the first of the cardinal virtues