I’m grateful for the clarity of your roadmap here — it’s helpful to see how the Five Ways connect to the attributes of classical theism.
As I was reading, I kept turning over the phrase "natural theology." When Augustine speaks of creation bearing witness, or when Aquinas begins from motion and causation, I sometimes wonder whether they mean something more integral by “nature” than we tend to mean today. Not simply the abstraction “the created world,” but a reality already experienced as beautiful, intelligible, ordered, and speaking.
I find myself asking whether we modern readers even fully share that sense of what “creation” is. Do we still perceive the world as something given and meaningful in itself, prior to analysis? Or do we begin from abstraction and move outward?
Your post stirred that question for me in a good way. I’d love to keep thinking along these lines — these are conversations worth having.
I like how clearly you walked through this, Alex. It felt simplistic enough yet also very insightful. I especially liked your explanation of simplicity. The point about composite beings depending on their parts, and how that would undermine God being first, made the idea much more concrete. The section on goodness also stood out to me. Tying goodness to existence itself, rather than treating it as just one trait among others, really clarifies why omnibenevolence is not just added on later.
This is a really good "speedrun" of classical theism, and I'm looking forward to a comparison with personal theism if that is on the docket. I'm a major devotee of the idea that the harder or longer it is for someone to explain something, the less likely it is that their explanation is going to be worthwhile, let alone correct. This was short and sweet ;)
Maybe you are already building toward this, but I do think though that even on a natural level, you cannot avoid "personal theism," and that the idea of God as a "Person" or "Persons" is a prerequisite to any consideration of God's nature. "Personhood" is the highest and most godly attribute to be found in creation, itself existentially based on the relationship of Lover and Beloved in Love (man and woman united in the act that personally defines them as such), and thus the most godly attribute predicable by us of God Himself (Themselves) per God's Own manifest will in creating us as lovers and beloveds in love.
It is pretty self evident that one can only truly know and love what is to one's own image and likeness, and thus, even on a practical level of knowing, loving, and serving God, the final end of theology has to be in discovering and fulfilling the mutual image and likeness between God and man, which I believe is in the discovery of personhood in romance. To the best of my knowledge, and for all of his other merits, I think St. Thomas systemically missed that in his work :/.
I think a particular danger is in not recognizing that "potency" is more generally the ability to be acted upon, and that doesn't necessarily mean change or imperfection: it could just mean passivity in the sense of being known and loved as "beloved," as is the Holy Spirit in relation to the Lover Who is the Son. (God the Father has to be the Love Itself, because that is the pure Act and has to come first in logical progression).
Of course, there is always the possibility that we all just actually agree on principle, but differ in semantics and focus...
Thanks for your kind words! That's not how I would define potency, at least not as it is relevant to this discussion. But for what it's worth, Aquinas was certainly concerned with theology serving a genuine love of God, which can be seen in his personal life (Non nisi te Domine, and such).
I dont think the arguments Aquinas puts forth in step 2 require a totally unchanging being, just one which doesnt change in respect to its existence or hasnt yet changed with respect to its existence.
Step 4 makes some claims which I think are susceptible to a moorean shift, which would result in some parts (to be specific, Gods parts) being inseparable from the being, and some composite objects (namely, a single one, God) being uncaused. I think you would have to substantiate parts always being separable from their composites and composites always needing an efficient cause to counter such moorean shifts
The latter part of step 4 is countered by the doctrine of divine priority, which says for any part X of God, God metaphysically grounds X. This reverses the grounding order, making sure no aseity committments are broken. The grounding isnt circular either because God isnt identical to the mere set of his parts, but he is an object over and above his parts (this requires the denial of composition-as-identity views, but there are independent reasons from Leibnizes Law to reject such views so this isnt ad hoc).
I didn't include it in this article, but Aquinas argues for similar reasons that, necessarily, God's essence is his existence. The infinite regresses are not resolved without a being that, in principle, cannot change because if the being at any time or in any way is changing, then the regress starts all over again.
I promise I'm not trying to be difficult, but I don't see which "moorean shift" you're talking about. I know what the concept is, but I don't understand your objection.
I'll have to think more about your objection regarding the doctrine of divine priority. A few thoughts though:
I don't really see how your doctrine of divine priority resolves the problem that composite objects require some kind of further principle to compose them. If God is that principle, then it seems like he really isn't composite at all and I don't see how they could be his parts. But if he is not that principle, then there is something that causes God, which is incoherent.
Moreover, the doctrine of divine priority doesn't seem to resolve the problem that a composite object is potentially separated, because it was so at one time. But God cannot have any potencies.
I dont see how the prime mover having potency unrelated to his existence would resume the regress. Potencies like that can either:
1. go unactualized
2. be actualized by the things the prime mover has actualized. For example, the prime movers potential to feel happy about the moral virtue of humans can be actualized by humans cultivating moral virtues. I dont see how that would entail that the prime mover itself was moved from potential to actuality by a previous mover.
Mb for not elaborating on the moorean shift. Let me explicate with an example. Ordinarily, a classical theist would argue
1. God is uncaused
2. If X is composite, X is caused.
3. Therefore, God isnt composite.
A neo-classical theist would simply hit back with
1. God is uncaused
2. God is composite
3. Therefore, it isnt the case that if X is composite, X is caused.
Similarly, a CTist might say
1. God isnt dependent
2. If X is a composite, X depends on its parts
3. Therefore, God isnt composite
and the NCTist would rejoinder:
1. God isnt dependent
2. God is composite
3. Therefore, its false that if X is a composite, X depends on its parts.
My moorean shift counterarguments similarly reject the principle that for any composite object X, X needs a principle or cause which composed or is composing its parts.
God would simply lack the potential for his parts to be separated. Its also the case that there was no time when his parts were separate. Its a common metaphysical adage that tropes are individuated by their bearers. This metaphysical principle entails that Gods tropes (his parts) of omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc cannot exist apart from God, their bearer. This metaphysical principle itself is justified by the inconceivability of tropes floating all free and rarified distinxt from their bearers. I personally cannot imagine a trope of bare sentience all by itself, without any bearer. Ditto for power and goodness.
I’m grateful for the clarity of your roadmap here — it’s helpful to see how the Five Ways connect to the attributes of classical theism.
As I was reading, I kept turning over the phrase "natural theology." When Augustine speaks of creation bearing witness, or when Aquinas begins from motion and causation, I sometimes wonder whether they mean something more integral by “nature” than we tend to mean today. Not simply the abstraction “the created world,” but a reality already experienced as beautiful, intelligible, ordered, and speaking.
I find myself asking whether we modern readers even fully share that sense of what “creation” is. Do we still perceive the world as something given and meaningful in itself, prior to analysis? Or do we begin from abstraction and move outward?
Your post stirred that question for me in a good way. I’d love to keep thinking along these lines — these are conversations worth having.
I like how clearly you walked through this, Alex. It felt simplistic enough yet also very insightful. I especially liked your explanation of simplicity. The point about composite beings depending on their parts, and how that would undermine God being first, made the idea much more concrete. The section on goodness also stood out to me. Tying goodness to existence itself, rather than treating it as just one trait among others, really clarifies why omnibenevolence is not just added on later.
This is a really good "speedrun" of classical theism, and I'm looking forward to a comparison with personal theism if that is on the docket. I'm a major devotee of the idea that the harder or longer it is for someone to explain something, the less likely it is that their explanation is going to be worthwhile, let alone correct. This was short and sweet ;)
Maybe you are already building toward this, but I do think though that even on a natural level, you cannot avoid "personal theism," and that the idea of God as a "Person" or "Persons" is a prerequisite to any consideration of God's nature. "Personhood" is the highest and most godly attribute to be found in creation, itself existentially based on the relationship of Lover and Beloved in Love (man and woman united in the act that personally defines them as such), and thus the most godly attribute predicable by us of God Himself (Themselves) per God's Own manifest will in creating us as lovers and beloveds in love.
It is pretty self evident that one can only truly know and love what is to one's own image and likeness, and thus, even on a practical level of knowing, loving, and serving God, the final end of theology has to be in discovering and fulfilling the mutual image and likeness between God and man, which I believe is in the discovery of personhood in romance. To the best of my knowledge, and for all of his other merits, I think St. Thomas systemically missed that in his work :/.
I think a particular danger is in not recognizing that "potency" is more generally the ability to be acted upon, and that doesn't necessarily mean change or imperfection: it could just mean passivity in the sense of being known and loved as "beloved," as is the Holy Spirit in relation to the Lover Who is the Son. (God the Father has to be the Love Itself, because that is the pure Act and has to come first in logical progression).
Of course, there is always the possibility that we all just actually agree on principle, but differ in semantics and focus...
Thanks for your kind words! That's not how I would define potency, at least not as it is relevant to this discussion. But for what it's worth, Aquinas was certainly concerned with theology serving a genuine love of God, which can be seen in his personal life (Non nisi te Domine, and such).
Fair enough :) Thank you for the reply and your ongoing work!
Thanks for your comment! I always really appreciate feedback, especially on other posts regarding natural theology and theistic personalism!
I dont think the arguments Aquinas puts forth in step 2 require a totally unchanging being, just one which doesnt change in respect to its existence or hasnt yet changed with respect to its existence.
Step 4 makes some claims which I think are susceptible to a moorean shift, which would result in some parts (to be specific, Gods parts) being inseparable from the being, and some composite objects (namely, a single one, God) being uncaused. I think you would have to substantiate parts always being separable from their composites and composites always needing an efficient cause to counter such moorean shifts
The latter part of step 4 is countered by the doctrine of divine priority, which says for any part X of God, God metaphysically grounds X. This reverses the grounding order, making sure no aseity committments are broken. The grounding isnt circular either because God isnt identical to the mere set of his parts, but he is an object over and above his parts (this requires the denial of composition-as-identity views, but there are independent reasons from Leibnizes Law to reject such views so this isnt ad hoc).
I recommend Fowlers Divine Priority Monism paper and Barddofs aseity paper
I'll do my best to check them out!
I didn't include it in this article, but Aquinas argues for similar reasons that, necessarily, God's essence is his existence. The infinite regresses are not resolved without a being that, in principle, cannot change because if the being at any time or in any way is changing, then the regress starts all over again.
I promise I'm not trying to be difficult, but I don't see which "moorean shift" you're talking about. I know what the concept is, but I don't understand your objection.
I'll have to think more about your objection regarding the doctrine of divine priority. A few thoughts though:
I don't really see how your doctrine of divine priority resolves the problem that composite objects require some kind of further principle to compose them. If God is that principle, then it seems like he really isn't composite at all and I don't see how they could be his parts. But if he is not that principle, then there is something that causes God, which is incoherent.
Moreover, the doctrine of divine priority doesn't seem to resolve the problem that a composite object is potentially separated, because it was so at one time. But God cannot have any potencies.
I dont see how the prime mover having potency unrelated to his existence would resume the regress. Potencies like that can either:
1. go unactualized
2. be actualized by the things the prime mover has actualized. For example, the prime movers potential to feel happy about the moral virtue of humans can be actualized by humans cultivating moral virtues. I dont see how that would entail that the prime mover itself was moved from potential to actuality by a previous mover.
Mb for not elaborating on the moorean shift. Let me explicate with an example. Ordinarily, a classical theist would argue
1. God is uncaused
2. If X is composite, X is caused.
3. Therefore, God isnt composite.
A neo-classical theist would simply hit back with
1. God is uncaused
2. God is composite
3. Therefore, it isnt the case that if X is composite, X is caused.
Similarly, a CTist might say
1. God isnt dependent
2. If X is a composite, X depends on its parts
3. Therefore, God isnt composite
and the NCTist would rejoinder:
1. God isnt dependent
2. God is composite
3. Therefore, its false that if X is a composite, X depends on its parts.
My moorean shift counterarguments similarly reject the principle that for any composite object X, X needs a principle or cause which composed or is composing its parts.
God would simply lack the potential for his parts to be separated. Its also the case that there was no time when his parts were separate. Its a common metaphysical adage that tropes are individuated by their bearers. This metaphysical principle entails that Gods tropes (his parts) of omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc cannot exist apart from God, their bearer. This metaphysical principle itself is justified by the inconceivability of tropes floating all free and rarified distinxt from their bearers. I personally cannot imagine a trope of bare sentience all by itself, without any bearer. Ditto for power and goodness.
Awesome. You have got to do more speedruns
Wicked sweet title, Alex!
Hey! Thanks for the post. Question: did you choose the order of the attributes with any specific intent?
Also, as you may know, some Thomists argue that the fourth and fifth ways implicitly contain a limited regress claim as well. (Just sharing 😂)
Mostly because they were more or less the order Thomas used, though I made a few small edits that, I thought, were more intuitive in this format.